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The Federal Circuit’s Summary Affirmance Habit 
The Federal Circuit is certainly unique among the circuit courts of 
appeals. Its exclusive jurisdiction over patents places it in a powerful 
position. But with that power comes a responsibility to oversee the 
development of the law. And in the last decade, the court has fallen short 
of fulfilling this obligation—particularly with regard to clarifying 
provisions of the America Invents Act.  
The court has repeatedly disregarded important questions of law by 
use of Rule 36 summary affirmance. Though other courts of appeals 
regularly use summary disposition as a means of dealing with burgeoning 
dockets, the Federal Circuit uses summary affirmance at a much higher 
rate and to dismiss unresolved legal questions.  
This Comment explores some of the possible reasons why the court 
uses summary affirmance so frequently. After discussing summary dis-
position more generally, it specifically presents the theory of cert-
proofing—or avoiding Supreme Court review—as one possible 
explanation. It concludes by offering some solutions to curb the court’s 
summary affirmance habit.  
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To say the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) is unique among appellate courts is an 
understatement. Whereas other federal courts of appeals are 
limited by region and function as courts of general jurisdiction, the 
Federal Circuit’s docket is governed primarily by subject matter.1 
Although the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction encompasses adjudi-
catory authority in such areas as government contracts and labor 
disputes, it was primarily founded to oversee the development of 
patent law.2 
In the 1970s, the Carter administration recognized that confu-
sion in patent law was crippling the country’s economic growth.3 
Inconsistency among the regional circuits revealed the need for 
uniformity and consistency.4 The solution to these problems was 
the creation of a national court with exclusive subject matter juris-
diction over patent appeals. 
Yet since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit has been a 
source of controversy, with lawyers, academics, and judges criticiz-
ing the court’s alleged inconsistencies.5 Many of these criticisms are 
 
 1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). 
 2. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1989). 
 3. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 822 (2005). 
 4. Id. at 823. 
 5. See, e.g., Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 
(2014) (sharply criticizing the Federal Circuit’s decision-making); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving 
the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 350, 352 (2014); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, 
Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 
89 (2015); Ashby Jones, Critics Fault Court’s Grip on Appeals for Patents, WALL STREET J. (July 6, 
2014, 7:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/critics-fault-courts-grip-on-appeals-for-patents 
-1404688219. 
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related to the development of patent doctrine and the decision-
making of individual judges.6 Little has been written concerning the 
court’s procedural habits. Among the court’s interesting proce-
dural behaviors is its regular use of Rule 36 summary affirmance, 
or affirmance of the lower court without an opinion.7 While aca-
demics have considered the court’s summary affirmance rate from 
a statistical viewpoint,8 the reasons for and practical implications of 
this practice have garnered much less attention.9 
In this Comment, I analyze the Federal Circuit’s Rule 36 practice 
and plausible explanations for the court’s proportionally high use 
of summary affirmance. The court may very well be using sum-
mary affirmance properly in response to a growing and complex 
caseload. But based on a review of summarily affirmed cases, this 
seems unlikely. Rather, it appears that the Federal Circuit is using 
Rule 36 improperly and, consequently, hindering the development 
of patent law.10 Although summary affirmance is a necessary tool 
the Federal Circuit should arguably employ to handle its case 
load,11 I argue the court should avoid shying away from unresolved 
questions and instead look to other solutions that would have less- 
damaging effects on development of the law. 
This Comment proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I provide back-
ground on the progression of patent law over the last half-century 
 
 6. See, e.g., Ted L. Field, Hyperactive Judges: An Empirical Study of Judge-Dependent 
“Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit, 38 VT. L. REV. 625 (2014). 
 7. See FED. CIR. R. 36. 
 8. E.g., Beth Zeitlin Shaw, Please Ignore This Case: An Empirical Study of Nonprece-
dential Opinions in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013 (2004). 
 9. Two articles—recently made public—consider the legality of the Federal Circuit 
issuing an opinion in Patent and Trademark Office appeals. Dennis Crouch, Wrongly Affirmed 
Without Opinion, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561 (2017); Matthew J. Dowd, An Examination of the 
Federal Circuit’s Use of Rule 36 Summary Affirmances (Feb. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920306. Beyond these two articles, 
neither of which makes all the observations made herein, very little has been said about the 
Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance habit. 
 10. I am not alone in this critique. See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 9; Matthew Bultman, 
Fed. Cir. Issuing More ‘Hidden Decisions’ amid Case Influx, LAW360 (Mar. 1, 2017, 12:06 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/894024/fed-circ-issuing-more-hidden-decisions-amid 
-case-influx; Peter Harter & Gene Quinn, Rule 36: Unprecedented Abuse at the Federal Circuit, 
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/12/rule-36-abuse 
-federal-circuit/id=76971/. 
 11. But see Crouch, supra note 9 (arguing that the Federal Circuit is statutorily requi-
red to issue opinions in certain appeals). 
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and point out questions left unanswered by recent statutory reform. 
Although I focus on questions created by the America Invents Act, 
the discussion that follows is applicable to all legal questions 
presented before the Federal Circuit. In Part II, I discuss summary 
disposition generally and detail the primary benefits and draw-
backs of the Federal Circuit’s use of Rule 36. Specific cases are 
explored as a means of revealing the potentially damaging effects 
of summary affirmance. In Part III, I explore plausible explanations 
for why summary affirmance is being used at such a high rate. 
Some alternative means of controlling the court’s docket are 
considered in Part IV. Part V concludes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The creation of the Federal Circuit came after a decade of heated 
debate. An overburdened judiciary and a need for greater uni-
formity in certain areas of federal law prompted discussion of 
creating a new federal court of appeals.12 Yet there were concerns 
that a specialized court would become subject to tunnel vision, 
produce less than thorough opinions, and be at risk of capture by 
interest groups.13 Ultimately, Congress decided to merge the 
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the 
appellate division of the United States Court of Claims to create a 
court with specialized subject matter jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction over all patent appeals from the district courts.14 
Congress hoped that endowing the court with exclusive 
jurisdiction over patent appeals would bring about uniformity in 
the law.15 According to the former Chief Judge Howard T. Markey, 
prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, the field of patent law 
was “glaringly chaotic.”16 However, the mere creation of a new 
court did not achieve the result of clarifying the law. Patent 
 
 12. Charles Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National 
Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 44–46 (1984) (discussing the formation of the Federal Circuit). 
 13. Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Origins, 
in THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982–1990, at 
28–30 (1991). 
 14. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
 15. Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 422–23 (2009). 
 16. HOWARD T. MARKEY, THE FIRST TWO THOUSAND DAYS: REPORT OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1982–1988, at 3 (1988). 
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secrecy17 was rampant, resulting in a system that “operated non-
transparently, with great subjectivity, and with distressing unpre-
dictability.”18 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act of 1994 brought much-needed reform to the patent 
system but failed to free the system from “non-transparency, sub-
jectivity, unpredictability, and excessive complexity.”19 Congres-
sional efforts to overhaul the U.S. patent system began with the 
Patent Reform Act of 2005, but such efforts were met with industry 
group opposition and repeatedly failed.20 In 2011, contention be-
tween Congress and industry groups finally transformed into legal 
change in the form of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). 
A. The America Invents Act 
The AIA is the most comprehensive piece of patent legislation 
in the last sixty years.21 It attempts to reduce uncertainty in the 
patent system and “increas[e] opportunities for third-party 
involvement both pre- and post-issuance” of a patent.22 To this end, 
the AIA changes from a first-to-file to a first-to-invent system, 
creates new post-grant methods of challenging a patent, and 
establishes a new Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) to handle 
post-grant reviews and inter partes reviews.23 A thorough review of 
the AIA can and has occupied hundreds of pages of academic 
writing. Here, I limit my review of the AIA to a surface-level look 
at new post-grant proceedings and the creation of the PTAB to 
highlight questions of law left unanswered by the AIA’s plain 
meaning. The analysis that follows this background discussion is 
not limited to the AIA; I have simply chosen to analyze the AIA 
because it presents easy-to-find, unresolved questions. 
 
 17. That is information only known to the inventor or, at the very least, information 
unavailable to the general public. 
 18. Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for 
Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 8 (2012). 
 19. See id. at 9. 
 20. Hung H. Bui, An Overview of Patent Reform Act of 2011: Navigating the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act Including Effective Dates for Patent Reform, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 441, 443 (2011). 
 21. Id. at 445. 
 22. Michael Dixon, The Sweeping Changes of the 2011 America Invents Act, 18 WESTLAW 
J. INTELL. PROP. 2, at *1 (2012). 
 23. Bui, supra note 20 (providing a comprehensive overview of the AIA). 
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1. Post-grant proceedings 
The AIA introduced three new types of post-grant procedures: 
inter partes review (IPR),24 covered business method (CBM) patent 
review,25 and post-grant review (PGR).26 Each of these procedures 
is conducted before the newly created PTAB, providing third 
parties opportunities to challenge the validity of issued patents. 
 a. Post-grant review. A PGR is a PTAB trial proceeding during 
which a third party challenges the validity of a patent on the basis 
of any condition required for patentability.27 A PGR must be 
initiated within nine months after the patent in question is granted 
or reissued.28 The PTAB may institute a PGR if the petition 
“demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least one of 
the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”29 The PTAB 
may also institute a PGR upon “a showing that the petition raises a 
novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents 
or patent applications.”30 
b. Covered business method patent review. A CBM patent is a patent 
“that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing 
data processing or other operations used in the practice, admini-
stration, or management of a financial product or service, except 
that the term does not include patents for technological inven-
tions.”31 CBM reviews are tried before the PTAB and governed by 
PGR procedures and general trial practice procedures explained in 
regulations.32 Only a party sued or charged with patent infringe-
ment of a CBM patent may petition for CBM review.33 And CBM 
review is only available nine months after the grant of the patent.34 
In order for the PTAB to begin a CBM patent review, (1) it must be 
more likely than not that the petitioner could prevail on at least one 
 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2015). 
 25. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011); 
37 C.F.R. §§ 42.300–.304 (2012). 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2015). 
 27. Id. § 321(a)–(b). 
 28. Id. § 321(c). 
 29. 37 C.F.R. § 42.208 (2016). 
 30. Id. 
 31. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301 (2012). 
 32. Id. § 42.300. 
 33. Id. § 42.302(a). 
 34. Id. § 42.403. 
 
HOFFMAN_EE2 (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/18  10:04 AM 
419 The Federal Circuit’s Summary Affirmance Habit 
 425 
claim or (2) the petitioner must raise a novel or unsettled legal 
question important to other patents.35 Although the CBM review 
does not allow for the review of all patents, it can be a powerful tool 
for accused infringers for a few reasons: (1) unlike an IPR, a CBM 
allows validity challenges on any ground that is a condition for 
patentability,36 and (2) an accused infringer may file a petition for 
CBM review any time PGR is unavailable.37 
c. Inter partes review. The IPR is another trial proceeding during 
which the validity of a patent is challenged using only prior art or 
printed publications with the petitioner requesting to cancel at least 
one claim as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.38 Anyone 
other than the patent owner may file a petition.39 The petition must 
be filed at the later of (1) nine months after the grant of the patent 
or (2) the close of any post-grant review.40 The patent owner, in 
response to an IPR petition, may file a preliminary response “limit-
ed to setting forth the reasons why no inter partes review should be 
instituted.”41 The PTAB may grant IPR of a patent if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner could prevail on at least 
one claim.42 
2. Creation of the PTAB 
The PTAB replaced the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences, the main judicial body of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO). One of the primary reasons for creating 
an administrative body to adjudicate the three, new post-grant 
proceedings rather than relying on traditional Article III courts was 
to drive down litigation costs. The American Intellectual Property 
Law Association estimated that in low-stake patent lawsuits (in 
which less than $1 million is sought), litigation costs rose from 
$650,000 in 2005 to $700,000 in 2013.43 For high-stakes litigation 
 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a)–(b) (2012). 
 36. 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(2). 
 37. Id. § 42.303. 
 38. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
 39. Id. § 311(a). 
 40. Id. § 311(c). 
 41. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a). 
 42. Id. § 42.108(c). 
 43. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34 (2013). 
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during the same period, costs rose from $4.5 million to 
$5.5 million.44 Expedited procedures before an administrative body 
will ideally curb those figures. The PTAB also has the potential to 
reduce error costs.45 Whereas Article III judges are often generalists, 
administrative patent judges are required to be competent in 
matters of science and the law,46 allowing them to efficiently handle 
patent issues generally considered to be highly complex. 
Since its creation, the PTAB has been heavily used. In 2012, the 
USPTO published a regulation estimating the number of PGR, 
CBM review, and IPR petitions it expected the PTAB to handle.47 
Comparing these estimates to the actual number of petitions filed 
between 2013 and 2015, the PTAB experienced a 148% overage in 
petitions.48 Clearly, the new post-grant procedures created by the 
AIA are being utilized, and these additional opportunities for 
litigation have created an abundance of new legal issues. 
3. Legal questions created by new post-grant proceedings 
Though the AIA clarified some aspects of the patent system, it 
also ushered in a myriad of new legal questions. I have chosen to 
review only a select number of those questions, not necessarily 
because of their ultimate importance in the patent law scheme, but 
because the Federal Circuit, through summary disposition, has 
seemingly ignored, or at least unduly delayed, answering them. 
Specifically, I consider new issues related to motions to amend, 
waiver, and secondary considerations.  
During an IPR or PGR, the patent owner may file a motion to 
amend a patent, cancelling a challenged claim or proposing a rea-
sonable number of substitute claims.49 The IPR regulations promul-
gated under the AIA provide minimal guidelines with respect to 
motions to amend, leaving many questions unanswered; for 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare 
Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1567 (2016). 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
 47. Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial 
Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,651 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 48. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STA-
TISTICS 2 (2016). In total, between September 16, 2012, and July 31, 2016, the PTAB received 
5359 petitions. Id. 
 49. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.121(a), 42.221(a). 
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example, the regulations do not say who bears the burden of proof 
regarding patentability of amended claims and what the specific 
requirements are for successfully amending claims. 
The AIA is silent with respect to whether arguments not raised 
before the PTAB are waived on appeal. Although it is likely that the 
Federal Circuit will deem arguments not raised before the PTAB 
waived, it is unclear whether arguments made in an IPR prelimi-
nary response but not repeated after the PTAB’s institution decision 
are considered waived on appeal. 
The non-obviousness requirement is “the ultimate threshold for 
patentability.”50 Although obviousness is often proved by consider-
ing the scope and content of the prior art and differences between 
the prior art and the claims at issue, patent law allows for the use 
of secondary considerations to prove non-obviousness.51 Secondary 
considerations are the “economic and motivational . . . issues” that 
“might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding 
the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.”52 The 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have determined that in 
general patent disputes, secondary considerations can be given 
significant weight as they “may often be the most probative and 
cogent evidence in the record.”53 The question of what weight to 
give secondary considerations resurfaced with the creation of new 
post-grant proceedings and remains unanswered. 
Each of the aforementioned issues has passed before the Federal 
Circuit. But rather than resolve these new issues on first appear-
ance, the court used a method of summary disposition, allowing 
ambiguity and confusion to persist. Before exploring the specific 
cases in support of this claim, it is helpful to understand the 
development of summary disposition as a regular practice of 
the court. 
 
 50. Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of 
Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2074 (2011). 
 51. Id. at 2075. 
 52. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
 53. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
From June 30, 2015, to June 30, 2016, 60,099 cases were filed in 
the United States Courts of Appeals.54 Between 1971 and 2005, the 
courts of appeals experienced nearly a 500% increase in filings.55 
Although the Federal Circuit’s caseload has not experienced this 
type of growth, it has experienced both an increase in the total 
number of filings (particularly since implementation of the AIA56) 
and an “increase in the difficulty of the average case.”57 Given the 
number of cases pending before appellate courts, procedural reme-
dies have been created to quickly dismiss frivolous suits and insig-
nificant cases. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (Federal 
Rules) describe a number of these procedures. However, one meth-
od of disposition, summary disposition, or judgment without an 
opinion, is not explicitly contemplated by the Federal Rules. That 
said, the Federal Rules give appellate courts broad discretion to 
apply expedited procedures as necessary.58 Perhaps relying on this 
broad discretion, many courts have created specific provisions in 
their local rules describing the procedures for summary disposi-
tion.59 The Federal Circuit has such a rule.60 
 
 54. U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial Caseload Profile, U.S. CTS. (2016), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_appprofile0630.2016.pdf. 
 55. Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
287, 287 (2006). 
 56. Jon E. Wright & Pauline M. Pelletier, Don’t Let Your Patent Appeal Get Lost in the 
Crowd, NAT. L.J. (Jan. 25, 2016, 12:00 AM),  https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/alm 
ID/1202747725537/ (noting that between 2013 and 2015, the number of appeals coming from 
the Patent Office increased from less than 150 to more than 400). 
 57. Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the 
Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1181 (1999). 
 58. See FED. R. APP. P. 2. 
 59. E.g., 9TH CIR. R. 3-6; 3D CIR. R. 27.4. 
 60. FED. CIR. R. 36. 
The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion, citing this rule, 
when it determines that any of the following conditions exist and an opinion would 
have no precedential value: 
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is based on 
findings that are not clearly erroneous; 
(b) the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict is sufficient; 
(c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on 
the pleadings; 
(d) the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance under the 
standard of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review; or 
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Federal Circuit Rule 36 governs when the court may enter a 
judgment of affirmance without an opinion, requiring that certain 
conditions be met, including a determination that an opinion 
would have no precedential value and unanimity.61 The former 
Chief Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit explained that summary 
affirmance is appropriate when “it’s not necessary to explain, even 
to the loser, why he lost.”62 Explaining this principle in different 
terms, summary affirmance is appropriate “when the position of 
one party is so clearly correct as a matter of law that no substantial 
question regarding the outcome of the appeal exists.”63 
In recent years, the rate of summary disposition in the federal 
courts of appeals has increased. In 2012, the federal courts of 
appeals decided approximately 35,000 cases on the merits.64 Of 
those cases, about 5000 were summarily disposed.65 When a court 
chooses to summarily dispose of a case, it announces its judgment 
without providing written reasoning or analysis. Such judgments 
lack precedential value.66 
The creation of the PTAB resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
number of cases being appealed to the Federal Circuit, and the 
number of appeals coming from the district courts has held 
steady.67 The result is an overburdened Federal Circuit seemingly 
forced to find new ways to deal with its saturated docket. The 
Federal Circuit appears to have turned to Rule 36 as a means of 
easing its burden. On appeals coming from the USPTO in 2010, the 
Federal Circuit utilized Rule 36 thirty-seven percent of the time.68 
In 2015, the Federal Circuit employed Rule 36 fifty-eight percent of 
 
(e) a judgment or decision has been entered without an error of law. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 61. Id.; INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES FED. CIR. NO. 10.5. 
 62. The Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, 128 F.R.D. 409, 420 (1989). 
 63. Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 64. Colter Paulson, The Trend Toward the Use of Summary Dispositions, SIXTH CIRCUIT 
APPELLATE BLOG (May 14, 2013), http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis 
/the-trend-toward-the-use-of-summary-dispositions/. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Rates Tech., Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc., 688 F.3d 742, 750 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(citing U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 67. See Jason Rantanen, Data on Federal Circuit Appeals and Decisions, PATENTLYO 
(June 2, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/06/circuit-appeals-decisions.html. 
 68. Id. 
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the time.69 Since the creation of PTAB proceedings, the Federal 
Circuit has decided 113 PTAB appeals, sixty-one of which were 
disposed of by a Rule 36 affirmance.70 
While an initial statistical glance suggests that the Federal 
Circuit may be ignoring the letter of the law and using Rule 36 to 
“rubber stamp” PTAB decisions, a strong argument can be made 
that the statistics are bloated. Between December 2013 and Novem-
ber 2015, the Federal Circuit issued forty-two decisions stemming 
from IPR appeals.71 Of these decisions, twenty-one, or fifty percent, 
were summary affirmances.72 However, this statistic does not take 
into consideration the number of appeals awaiting a decision. As of 
November 2015, fourteen appeals had been argued and sufficient 
time had lapsed to all but rule out the possibility of a Rule 36 
summary affirmance.73 Taking these appeals into consideration, the 
actual number of IPR appeals summarily disposed drops to thirty-
seven percent. Comparing this figure to the summary affirmance 
rate in 2010, the recent use of Rule 36 seems reasonable from a 
statistical standpoint. 
However, even if the aforementioned statistical argument is 
persuasive, the Federal Circuit often uses summary affirmance 
inappropriately.74 Rule 36 summary affirmance should be used 
only when any of five conditions are met and an opinion would 
have no precedential value.75 As I will demonstrate in section II.B, 
the Federal Circuit has passed over opportunities to issue 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Elliot C. Cook, Daniel F. Klodowski & David C. Seastrunk, Federal Circuit PTAB 
Appeal Statistics: September 2016, FINNEGAN (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.aiablog.com/ptab 
-stats/federal-circuit-ptab-appeal-statistics-september-2016/. 
 71. Justin A. Hendrix & Jacob A. Schroeder, Surfs Up: Is the Federal Circuit Using Rule 
36 to Rubber-Stamp the PTAB’s Decisions in IPRs?, LEXOLOGY: FEDERAL CIRCUIT IP BLOG 
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b86d0f48-659f-42ac-a00a 
-d31451e84767. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. When I speak of the Federal Circuit generally, I do not mean to impugn the court’s 
integrity or dedication to the law. I speak of the judge who, on occasion at most, either reads 
Rule 36 loosely or pays less attention to the strict letter of the law. 
 75. FED. CIR. R. 36. 
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precedential opinions that could resolve issues generated by the 
creation of the AIA’s post-grant review proceedings.76 
A. Purpose of Summary Affirmance 
The primary benefit of summary affirmance is the preservation 
of court resources and time. In 2013, the Federal Circuit handled 
1381 appeals.77 In 2016, that number rose to 1839.78 The court’s 
resources have not matched this growth.79 Consequently, the court 
needs a tool to dispose of frivolous claims or cases presenting 
settled questions of law. Rule 36, with its discretion-limiting lan-
guage restraining judges, can be an effective means of controlling 
the court’s docket and resources without hurting development of 
the law. 
Although courts should not operate like machines at the cost of 
equity or fairness, efficiency is an important aim of the court 
system.80 Summary affirmance is a valuable tool for promoting 
efficiency, and when courts abide by summary affirmance 
guidelines, the aims of equity and efficiency can be simultaneously 
met. While more could be written about the value of summary 
affirmance, I focus on the primary drawbacks of improperly using 
Rule 36 to highlight a problem with the Federal Circuit’s 
current practice. 
 
 76. Litigants and scholars alike have expressly stated a belief that the Federal Circuit 
is dodging important questions of statutory interpretation through persistent use of Rule 36. 
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Pactiv, LLC v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 248 (2016) (No. 16-
205), 2016 WL 4363501 (“The Federal Circuit cannot avoid answering thorny questions of 
statutory interpretation by routinely issuing single-word summary affirmances.”); Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Raymond A. Mercado at 22, Pactiv, LLC v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 248 (2016) (No. 16-
205), 2016 WL 4921165 (“The Federal Circuit has twice dodged an important issue of 
statutory construction, affirming the case without opinion under a rule permitting it to do so 
when ‘an opinion would have no precedential value,’ even though no direct precedent on this 
question exists.”). 
 77. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Historical Caseload, U.S. CT. 
APPEALS FOR FED. CIR.  (2016), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court 
/statistics/FY16_Caseload_Overall_2.pdf. 
 78. Id. 
 79. In the sense that the number of Federal Circuit judges and clerks has not increased. 
 80. See generally Charles E. Clark, Making Courts Efficient, 8 UCLA L. REV. 489 (1961) 
(discussing why efficiency is important and some efforts made to improve judicial efficiency). 
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B. Hindering Development of Patent Law 
Summary disposition is an effective means of dismissing 
frivolous claims or suits that do not present a question of 
importance, but it comes with a significant error cost.81 Most 
circuits—including the Federal Circuit—agree that when a 
published opinion is not produced, a case cannot serve as 
precedent. “The heart of the common law [sic] system is the written 
judicial opinion.”82 Opinions “are what courts do . . . . They are the 
substance of judicial action . . . .”83 Written opinions are key to the 
operation of our system of stare decisis,84 and without them, the 
state of the law would be in confusion. “[J]udges and lawyers are 
utterly dependent upon published opinions to research, evaluate, 
argue, and decide cases—the most basic of legal tasks.”85 
Publishing opinions is a key function of appellate courts inasmuch 
the federal courts of appeals are “needed to announce, clarify, and 
harmonize the rules of decision employed by the legal system in 
which they serve.”86 This function is particularly important in an 
age in which the Supreme Court hears a mere fraction of appellate 
court cases.87 
 
 81. Many scholars and judges have discussed the potential drawbacks of summary 
disposition of appeals. See, e.g., Nat’l Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 174 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[T]his court should at least give the parties a statement of reasons in the 
court’s own words, if for no other reason than to indicate that the court in fact thoughtfully 
reviewed the agency’s determination.”); United States v. Glover, 731 F.2d 41, 48–53 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Mikva, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns with deviating from the normal appellate 
process); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807, 814–15 (1979) (suggesting that the limited publication rule 
does not increase judicial productivity); Charles R. Haworth, Screening and Summary Proce-
dures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 257, 320 (1973) (explaining 
some of the consequences of summary disposition in the federal courts of appeals). I choose 
to focus on how summary affirmance hinders development of the law. 
 82. John Reid, Doe Did Not Sit—the Creation of Opinions by an Artist, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 
59, 59 (1963). 
 83. Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 
810, 819 (1961). 
 84. Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does 
the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 
AM. U. L. REV. 757, 770–75 (1995) (discussing the relationship between published opinions 
and stare decisis). 
 85. Id. at 759. 
 86. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 3 (1976). 
 87. Between September 30, 2014, and September 30, 2015, 34,244 cases were decided 
on the merits in the courts of appeals (not including the Federal Circuit). ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
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The number of appeals has dramatically increased over the last 
few decades88 while the number of cases heard by the Supreme 
Court has dropped.89 The congruence of these two events has 
resulted in the appellate courts adopting a more important role as 
“the courts of last resort for the vast majority of litigants.”90 The 
federal courts of appeals “have become important policymakers,”91 
leading some to suggest that “[j]udges on the U.S. courts of appeals 
are among the most powerful people in American politics.”92 In the 
nineteenth century, some argued that judges do not “make” law—
they only find and declare it.93 That belief is now largely considered 
fantasy, with most contending that judges do “make” law 
inasmuch as they develop the common law, interpret statutes, and 
create precedent.94 This is certainly true with regard to the 
Federal Circuit. 
Up until the last decade, the Supreme Court had all but fled 
from the patent law scene, making the Federal Circuit “the de 
facto supreme court of patents.”95 Although the Supreme Court 
has developed a greater interest in the development of patent law, 
the Federal Circuit remains the primary developer,96 consistent 
 
U.S. COURTS, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS tbl. B (2015). That same year, 4715 petitions 
for review on writ of certiorari were filed from the circuit courts (not including the Federal 
Circuit), and only 136 were granted, representing a mere 0.4% of cases terminated in the 
federal courts of appeals. Id. at tbl. B-2. 
 88. Catterson, supra note 55, at 287. 
 89. Adam Liptak, The Case of the Plummeting Supreme Court Docket, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/us/29bar.html?_r=0. 
 90. JENNIFER BARNES BOWIE ET AL., THE VIEW FROM THE BENCH AND CHAMBERS: EXAM-
INING JUDICIAL PROCESS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 1 (2014). 
 91. Id. at 2. 
 92. Id. at 11. 
 93. Many of these arguments were founded on the philosophy of William Blackstone. 
See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 63, 67–73 (Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1765). 
 94. See EDWARD F. HENNESSEY, JUDGES MAKING LAW 1 (1994); LOUIS L. JAFFE, ENGLISH 
AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWMAKERS 2 (1969); Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 J. SOC’Y 
PUB. TCHR. L. 22, 22 (1972). 
 95. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 387, 387 (2001). 
 96. Multiple reasons explain why the Federal Circuit remains, by and large, the devel-
oper of patent law. First, the Supreme Court often relies on the presence of a circuit split as 
an indicator when determining what cases to review. SUP. CT. R. 10; see H.W. PERRY, JR., 
DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 246 (1991). 
The Federal Circuit’s unique jurisdiction makes it difficult for the Supreme Court to rely on 
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with the role Congress envisioned when the Federal Circuit 
was created.97 
Through the early 2000s, the Federal Circuit arguably did an 
effective job fulfilling its purpose to unify patent law.98 And 
although the Federal Circuit by and large still fulfills this 
responsibility, recent use of Rule 36 summary affirmance has 
detracted from the court’s central function. Rather than address 
pressing issues, the Federal Circuit has employed Rule 36 to the 
confusion of litigants and the lower courts, ultimately increasing 
litigation costs. 
Some may argue that the PTAB’s decisions and subsequent 
affirmances on appeal are a sufficient guide for litigants. Since the 
creation of PTAB proceedings, the Federal Circuit has decided 113 
PTAB appeals.99 The Federal Circuit affirmed every issue in ninety 
(79.65%) of the cases.100 Some practitioners suggest that this high 
affirmance rate can be used as a guide for litigants wrestling with 
unresolved issues. Even assuming this pattern of affirmance is a 
good indicator of the Federal Circuit’s disposition, a key function 
of the Federal Circuit is to clarify patent law. The PTAB was not 
created to establish patent precedent—that role remains with the 
Federal Circuit. 
 
this indicator when reviewing Federal Circuit decisions. Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit 
Case Selection at the Supreme Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 275 (2013). Second, 
the Federal Circuit’s expertise makes it the prime court to review patent issues. Zachary 
Shapiro, Patent Law, Expertise, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, HARV. L.: BILL OF 
HEALTH (July 14, 2015, 1:43 AM), http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2015/07/14/patent 
-law-expertise-and-the-court-of-appeals-for-the-federal-circuit/. One needs only look to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics to see the 
confusion that can potentially stem from nonexperts tackling patent issues. See Heidi 
Ledford, Myriad Ruling Causes Confusion, 498 NATURE 281 (2013) (explaining the confusion 
caused by the Court’s decision). 
 97. See MARKEY, supra note 16, at 2; Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Origins, in UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT: A HISTORY: 1990–2002, at 3, 9–10 (2004) (suggesting that concerns over the state of 
patent law in America spurred the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
 98. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit 
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 788–89 (2008). 
 99. Klodowski, supra note 70. 
 100. Id. (including sixty-one cases where the court issued Rule 36 affirmances). 
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A habit of summary affirmance gives the impression—whether 
warranted or not—that the court is results oriented.101 Although 
litigants can present their merit arguments, the court has the final 
say on which appeals will be summarily disposed. Without a view 
into the black box of the court, there is a real risk that the public will 
believe the court is adjudicating for results and not justice. And 
with no opinion to explain their rationale, courts are helpless to 
respond to such accusations. 
In Owen Fiss’s seminal work, Against Settlement, Fiss argues 
that settlement brings peace, but not necessarily justice.102 The sigh 
of the judge whose case settles “is not a recognition that a job is 
done” but instead is an acknowledgment “that another case has 
been ‘moved along.’”103 While there can be value to avoidance, the 
lack of a judicial decision comes at a cost to society.104 Megan 
La Belle applies this idea in the patent context, reasoning that 
settlement causes unpredictability in patent law.105 The dearth of 
precedent caused by high proportions of settlement is particularly 
glaring in the patent world where development of the law is largely 
left to the courts.106 Summary affirmance has a similar effect as 
settlement—the precedential value of a decision is lost. Rule 36 
attempts to balance the worth of a precedential opinion with 
efficiency. Although efficiency is certainly a relevant and important 
public value, efficiency should not sharply undermine develop-
ment of the law.107 
 
 101. See John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize Appellate 
Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 196–200 (1984). 
 102. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–86 (1984). 
 103. Id. at 1086. 
 104. Id. at 1085–86; see Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior 
Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 630 (1991); see also 
supra Section II.B (discussing the costs of summary disposition). 
 105. Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 
405 (2014). 
 106. Id. at 405–06 (“[D]ecisional law, specifically Federal Circuit jurisprudence, has 
primarily formed and defined the patent landscape.”). 
 107. Additionally, a strong argument can be made that a precedential opinion actually 
increases the efficiency of the court system. See Fisch, supra note 104, at 591 (“[F]inality 
increases the efficiency of the judicial system by acting as a bar to relitigation of the same 
and similar claims and issues. . . .”). 
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In the years following the passage of the AIA, the Federal 
Circuit repeatedly punted on important issues.108 I consider a few 
of these issues to highlight a flaw with the court’s summary 
affirmance practice.109 
1. Motion to amend claims 
The IPR introduced a method for patent owners to amend a 
patent by cancelling any challenged patent claim or by proposing 
substitute claims, so long as such substituted claims do not “enlarge 
the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new matter.”110 
Although the USPTO provided some additional details concerning 
motions to amend,111 important questions, such as the requirements 
for amending claims, were initially left unanswered. Questions 
surrounding the motion to amend procedure, although not the 
hallmark of most patent disputes, were important and relevant 
inasmuch as motions to amend were filed by patent owners in 
twelve percent of all completed AIA proceedings.112 
In Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interactive Inc., the PTAB 
determined that the challenged claims of a patent were unpat-
entable as obvious based on prior art references.113 The Board also 
denied the patent owner’s motion to amend.114 In support of this 
conclusion, the PTAB stated that the patent owner failed to provide 
reasonable construction of the claim features added in the 
substitute claims, identify the written description support for the 
substitute claim, and prove that the new claims were patentable.115 
On appeal, the patent owner argued that it had clearly met the 
 
 108. See supra Section I.A.3. 
 109. Before proceeding into these issues, I note that within the last year the Federal 
Circuit has resolved a few questions related to these matters. Nonetheless, the court’s delay 
hindered development of the law and increased confusion and litigation costs. 
 110. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (2012). 
 111. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.21(d) (2015). 
 112. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MOTION TO 
AMEND STUDY 3 (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-04 
-30%20PTAB%20MTA%20study.pdf. 
 113. CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC, No. IPR2013-00033, Paper 
122 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2014). 
 114. Id. at 50. 
 115. Id. at 51–58. 
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motion to amend requirements established in 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.116 
Those requirements do not include establishing patentability as a 
condition of amending a claim. The patent owner argued that 
shifting the burden of proof to a patent owner would conflict with 
the AIA.117 Although the AIA gives the USPTO authority to 
promulgate regulations “setting forth standards and procedures 
for allowing the patent owner to move to amend the patent under 
[§ 316(d)],”118 this delegation did not confer on the USPTO 
authority to alter the statutory burden of proof. The USPTO 
intervened and argued that its procedures were in line with 
Congress’s purpose behind creating IPR proceedings—to eliminate 
claims that should not have been issued.119 Although the general 
motions practice rule of 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) places the burden of 
proof on the moving party, that regulation “is a procedural rule 
allocating the burden of proof in motions practice; it does not 
change the substantive showing required, which is spelled out in 
section 42.121.”120 Notwithstanding this ambiguity in the law, the 
Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the PTAB’s decision.121 
The Federal Circuit has since resolved this motion to amend 
issue.122 In Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
deferred to the PTAB’s reasoning, affirming that, among other 
things, the patent owner bears the burden of proving patentability 
of amended claims.123 The Federal Circuit could have easily 
employed this strategy in Helfrich Patent Licensing, LCC to affirm the 
PTAB’s decision and simultaneously clarify the law. Instead, the 
 
 116. Brief for Appellants at 41–42, Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interactive, 
Inc., 599 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-1556). 
 117. Id. at 45 (“In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner 
shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)). 
 118. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(9). 
 119. Brief for Intervenor, Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 599 
F. App’x 955 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1556). 
 120. Reply Brief of Appellants at 18, Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interac-
tive, Inc., 599 F. App’x 955 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1556). 
 121. Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 599 F. App’x 955 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (mem.). 
 122. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1306–08 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(“The Board has reasonably interpreted these provisions as requiring the patentee to show 
that its substitute claims are patentable over the prior art of record. . . .”). 
 123. Id. at 1307–08. 
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Federal Circuit waited a year before declaring an important motion 
to amend standard. Perhaps Helfrich Patent Licensing, LLC was 
summarily affirmed for justifiable reasons, but the striking 
similarities in the issues between these two cases suggests that the 
Federal Circuit missed an opportunity to provide a helpful, 
precedential opinion. 
2. Waiver 
In Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp., the PTAB construed a patent 
owner’s claims as obvious and therefore unpatentable.124 The 
patent owner argued that the petitioner’s references to prior art 
deviated from the claimed method. 125 In its response to a motion to 
amend claims, the petitioner introduced a new reference in hopes 
of rebutting the patent owner’s argument.126 Relying in part on this 
new reference, the PTAB rejected the patent owner’s defense.127  
On appeal, the patent owner argued that it was improper for 
the PTAB to consider the petitioner’s new reference submitted in 
petitioner’s response to a motion to amend claims.128 The USPTO 
argued that because the patent owner failed to move to exclude the 
reference before the PTAB, it had waived this argument.129 The 
patent owner defended its argument by contending that it “had no 
obligation to move to exclude evidence that was never offered for 
the purpose for which the Board ultimately used it.”130 Petitioner 
did not submit the reference to invalidate the original claim, but to 
invalidate the amended claims.131 Despite this waiver issue, the 
Federal Circuit issued a Rule 36 judgment.132 
 
 124. Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp., No. IPR2012-00005, Paper 68 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11,  2014). 
 125. See Anthony C. Tridico et al., PTAB Affirmance at the Federal Circuit, FINNEGAN (June 
2015), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/ptab-affirmance-at-the-federal-circuit.html. 
 126. Nichia’s Opposition to Encore’s Motion to Amend, Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp., 
No. IPR2012-00005 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2013), 2013 WL 5379466. 
 127. Nichia Corp., No. IPR2012-00005, Paper 68. 
 128. Tridico et al., supra note 125. 
 129. Brief for Intervenor at 18–23, Emcore Corp. v. Nichia Corp., 599 F. App’x 959 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1508). 
 130. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Emcore Corp. v. Nichia Corp., 599 F. App’x 959 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1508). 
 131. See Nichia’s Opposition to Emcore’s Motion to Amend at 5–9, Emcore Corp. v. 
Nichia Corp., No. IPR2012-00005 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2013), 2013 WL 5379466. 
 132. Emcore Corp. v. Nichia Corp., 599 F. Appx. 959 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (mem.). 
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The Federal Circuit has responded to other waiver questions 
such as whether a patent owner’s arguments made only in a 
preliminary response are waived on appeal.133 However, Emcore 
Corp. presented an interesting IPR specific waiver issue the Federal 
Circuit has yet to resolve. Like in Helfrich Patent Licensing, LCC, the 
Federal Circuit may have been justified in its issuance of a Rule 36 
judgment. However, by summarily affirming the decision of the 
PTAB, the Federal Circuit missed the opportunity to answer an 
important waiver question. 
III. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 
SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE PRACTICE 
In an ideal world, the Federal Circuit would issue an opinion in 
every case it heard. However, the ideal world is not reality. Circuit 
courts are overrun with appeals. Summary disposition is a useful 
and arguably necessary tool used to control a court’s docket. But if 
summary disposition was used solely to control an overrun docket, 
one would expect the circuit courts with the largest caseloads to use 
summary disposition the most; such is not the case. The Federal 
Circuit—whose caseload is dwarfed by other circuit courts’ 
dockets134—uses summary affirmance on a much more regular 
basis,135 suggesting that factors beyond docket size may be 
contributing to the court’s summary affirmance rate. 
A. De Novo Review 
The de novo standard of review often employed by the Federal 
Circuit likely contributes to the court’s frequent use of summary 
affirmance. Most appellate courts apply a “substantial evidence” or 
 
 133. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016); SAP Am., Inc., v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, 
Paper 81 at 3, 2013 WL 8605252 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 13, 2013) (holding Versata waived issues not 
raised once the trial was instituted). 
 134. For example, in 2015, 11,531 cases were initiated in the Ninth Circuit and 7843 
cases commenced in the Eleventh Circuit. During the 2015 fiscal year, 1711 appeals were filed 
in the Federal Circuit. See sources cited infra note 192. 
 135. Ted L. Field, “Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study, 47 
U.S.F. L. REV. 721, 746 (2012) (“The Federal Circuit was the only one of the circuits studied 
that uses summary affirmances in any appreciable amount.”). 
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“clearly erroneous” standard when reviewing questions of fact.136 
The Federal Circuit is unique in that it regularly uses a de novo 
standard when reviewing matters that “are undeniably factual in 
nature,” leading one practitioner to suggest the court has a “love 
affair with de novo review.”137 De novo review requires an appellate 
court to comb the record and become pseudo-experts in the case 
subject matter, a task that takes time. The Federal Circuit may be 
using summary affirmance as a means of compensating for the 
extra time spent reviewing factual decisions in complex cases. 
Some Federal Circuit judges have acknowledged flaws with the 
court’s rampant de novo review, suggesting the court “must avoid 
the temptation to label everything legal and usurp the province of 
the fact finder with [a] manufactured de novo review.”138 The 
Supreme Court has likewise acknowledged the issue and recently 
decided to curb the practice in the context of claim construction.139 
However, given the recency and narrowness of the Court’s 
decision, it is difficult to know whether the Federal Circuit’s obses-
sion with de novo review will come to an end. If it does not, the 
court may continue to use summary affirmance as a means of 
creating time to thoroughly review select cases. 
B. Then and Now: The Current Need for Summary Affirmance 
It is possible that prior to the recent increase in the number of 
appeals, the Federal Circuit was issuing opinions in cases in which 
use of Rule 36 was justified. Thus, what the court may be doing now 
is simply summarily affirming where they could have already been 
 
 136. See Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. REV. 469, 
475–81 (1988). 
 137. Gene Quinn, Supremes End Federal Circuit Love Affair with De Novo Review, 
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/20/supremes-end 
-federal-circuit-love-affair-with-de-novo-review/id=53873/; see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The 
Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1820–21, 1831–36 (2013) 
(explaining that the court often gives little deference to the USPTO and district courts). 
 138. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (dissenting opinion). 
 139. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) (“We 
hold that the appellate court must apply a ‘clear error,’ not a de novo, standard of review.”). 
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doing so.140 If this is the case, the court is obviously justified in 
its practice. 
Even though the Federal Circuit decides fewer cases than other 
circuits, most agree that the subject matter the court deals with can 
be quite complicated.141 Combine the complicated nature of the 
court’s cases with the increase in appeals from the PTAB and you 
get the perfect recipe for justifying an increased use of sum-
mary affirmance. 
C. Panel Collegiality 
An additional contributing factor could be an attempt to 
maintain panel collegiality. Judges care about collegiality on the 
bench.142 And on a court that works in panels, disagreement is 
uncomfortable and often results in additional work, such as issuing 
an opinion. Summary affirmance provides a means to avoid this 
extra work while creating unanimity. Additionally, judges may 
have strategic goals beyond articulating the law or promoting 
ideological preferences.143 For example, a judge may desire to be in 
the majority, further the aims of the court at large, “or build[] 
capital for future cases.”144 
D. Inadequate Briefing 
Another factor could be inadequate party briefing. Many are of 
the view that judges should answer only the questions explicitly 
 
 140. See Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ.’s Embrace of PTAB to Fuel More AIA Reviews, LAW360 
(Mar. 8, 2016, 1:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/767549 (“The purpose of writing 
an opinion is to provide guidance to the lower courts and litigants. . . . If all the Federal Circuit 
is doing is reviewing a fact-intensive determination on settled legal principles, there may be no 
guidance to be given and less use for a written opinion.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 141. See Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, 4 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 1, 13 (2004) (“Patent litigation involves some of the most complex legal theories and 
underlying factual issues of any type of litigation today.”). 
 142. See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDG-
ING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 112 (2006). 
 143. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) 
(discussing the strategic model of judicial decision-making). 
 144. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1639, 1653 (2003). To clarify, Judge Edwards opposes this view of strategic judicial 
decision-making. See id. at 1645–46. 
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presented before the court.145 If parties fail to adequately brief 
important, unanswered questions, fault arguably rests with the 
litigants and not the court.146 Summary affirmance may be perfectly 
appropriate if the potential for legal precedent is abolished by 
insufficient or scanty briefing.147 
E. Cert-Proofing 
Although the aforementioned factors may be the causes of the 
Federal Circuit’s high summary affirmance rate, below, I consider 
one additional hypothesis that, if true, is a cause of great concern 
and certainly justifies the call for reducing the court’s summary 
affirmance rate: “cert-proofing.” By issuing a summary affirmance, 
the court potentially shields the case from future Supreme Court 
review.148 While this hypothesis likely does not fully explain the 
court’s practice, it is a plausible factor in light of the recent 
relationship between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.149 
As shown in section II.B, multiple cases recently appealed to the 
Federal Circuit present interesting questions of law. The Federal 
Circuit’s summary affirmances with respect to these issues not only 
hindered development of the law but they limited Supreme Court 
 
 145. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQUETTE L. REV. 251, 254–
55 (2004). 
 146. See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(“[A]n issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief . . . is waived”); Cubic Def. Sys., 
Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 450, 467 (1999) (“Any experienced appellate litigator knows 
that issues not raised in a brief are waived.”). 
 147. The complexity of patents aside, it is difficult to see why patent litigators would 
be significantly worse at briefing issues than other civil litigators practicing before the other 
circuit courts of appeals where summary affirmance rates are much lower. 
 148. See Marla Brooke Tusk, Note, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney 
Speech, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 1216 (2003) (“There is even some speculation that, because 
the Supreme Court is less likely to grant certiorari to an appeal from an unpublished opinion, 
appellate judges may decide controversial cases via unpublished opinions simply to insulate 
those decisions from Supreme Court review.”). 
 149. I note that I am not the first to suggest that the Federal Circuit may inappropriate-
ly be using Rule 36 summary affirmance. See Paul Stancil, Cert-Proof 97–98 (J. Reuben Clark 
Law Sch., Brigham Young U., Research Paper No. 16-05, Mar. 29, 2016), https://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756112; Matthew Bultman, Fed. Cir. Asked to Decide 
When Appeals Require Opinion, LAW360 (Mar. 1, 2017, 6:57 PM), https://www.law360.com 
/articles/897013/fed-circ-asked-to-decide-when-appeals-require-opinion. I, like Professor 
Paul Stancil, cannot definitively say that the Federal Circuit uses summary affirmance to 
reduce the likelihood of Supreme Court review. I merely present cert-proofing as a plau-
sible theory. 
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review. A summary disposition is less likely to warrant review by 
the Supreme Court.150 This is particularly true in the context of 
Federal Circuit summary affirmances because such cases lack 
precedential value.151 The Supreme Court is unlikely to consider a 
case void of precedential value. Not only is such a case assumed to 
lack significant questions of law, but the Court would be required 
to expend extra time and resources to determine if an important, 
cert-worthy question exists.152 
Because Rule 36 cases are unlikely to be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court and given that tension seems to exist between the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court,153 one could argue that the 
Federal Circuit may be using summary affirmance as a means of 
“cert-proofing” cases. No appellate court enjoys being overruled.154 
This general statement holds true for the Federal Circuit. Multiple 
scholars have pointed out that there appears to be a growing 
tension between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.155 
From its inception, the Federal Circuit has recognized its unique 
role in patent law jurisprudence and asserted its position in 
developing the law.156 Yet in the last decade, the Supreme Court has 
 
 150.  Stancil, supra note 149, at 24; see also Rachel Hughey, How to Get to Federal Circuit 
Rule 36, LAW360 (July 29, 2015, 10:19 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/684264/how 
-to-get-to-federal-circuit-rule-36 (“A Rule 36 affirmance is nearly impossible to obtain rehear-
ing or rehearing en banc, or seek U.S. Supreme Court certiorari, because there is no appellate 
decision to challenge.”). 
 151. Rates Tech., Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc., 688 F.3d 742, 750 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing 
U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 152.  Stancil, supra note 149, at 24. 
 153. Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Relationship with the 
Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 275, 276 (2012). 
 154. See MARK HERRMANN, THE CURMUDGEON’S GUIDE TO PRACTICING LAW 4 (2006) 
(“Judges do not like to be reversed. Accordingly, if a precedent contains the implicit threat 
of reversal, I will use that threat (gently, of course) when I discuss that case. . . .”). 
 155. See, e.g., Arthur J. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, The Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 844 (2006) (discussing how the Federal Circuit is 
potentially becoming the “‘Ninth Circuit’ of the twenty-first century”); Gretchen S. Sween, 
Who’s Your Daddy? A Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme Court’s Recent Patent Jurisprudence, 
7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 204 (2009). 
 156. Debra D. Peterson, Can This Brokered Marriage Be Saved? The Changing Relationship 
Between the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit in Patent Law Jurisprudence, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 210–11 (2003). 
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attempted to “rein in” the Federal Circuit.157 Beginning in 2005, the 
Supreme Court reversed a trend of avoiding patent cases, hearing 
twenty-seven cases over the next ten years and overturning the 
Federal Circuit’s holding in twenty-two of those cases.158 
One strong example highlighting the conflict between the 
courts is the debate over the patentability of isolated human genes. 
In 2011, the Federal Circuit decided a case in favor of patentability 
of isolated DNA strands.159 The Supreme Court remanded the case, 
instructing the Federal Circuit to consider the Court’s recent 
restriction on the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. On re-
mand, the Federal Circuit reached the same result as in 2011 using 
much of the same analysis.160 As one law professor stated, “The 
Federal Circuit wrote the same decision twice.”161 Not surprisingly, 
the Supreme Court reviewed the case and unanimously reversed 
the decision of the Federal Circuit.162 The remarks of Chief Justice 
John Roberts effectively summarize the tug-of-war relationship 
between the courts evident in the example just described. Speak-
ing of the circuit courts of appeals, the Chief Justice said, “Well, 
they don’t have a choice, right? They can’t say, I don’t like the 
Supreme Court rule so I’m not going to apply it, other than the 
Federal Circuit.”163 
The theory that the court uses summary affirmance to cert-
proof its decisions is not without flaws, the biggest being that the 
Federal Circuit may have summarily affirmed each case for a 
legitimate reason (i.e., an opinion would have no precedential 
 
 157. Steven Seidenberg, Tug-of-War over Interpretations of Patent Law Continues Between Fed-
eral Circuit and SCOTUS, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/maga 
zine/article/tug_of_war_over_interpretations_of_patent_law_continues_between_federal. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), and opinion vacated, appeal reinstated sub nom.; 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. 
Cir.  2012). 
 160. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 161. Seidenberg, supra note 157. 
 162. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 163. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF BIO, Inc., 556 U.S. 
635 (2009) (No. 07-1437) (emphasis added). 
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value and the trial court or administrative agency correctly decided 
the case). Qualifying for summary disposition is not an easy task. 
A party must show that its position “is so clearly correct as a matter 
of law that no substantial question regarding the outcome of the 
appeal exists.”164 This high bar checks the courts from disposing of 
meritorious questions of law. Yet, as the case sampling herein 
reveals, it seems likely that substantial questions of law have been 
ignored by the Federal Circuit.165 
An additional counter-argument against the idea of cert-
proofing is that no case is ever truly cert-proofed. “[T]he Court 
grants certiorari to review unpublished and summary decisions 
with some frequency.”166 As recently as 2015, the Supreme Court 
reviewed an appellate summary affirmance decision.167 The Justices 
themselves have noted that an unpublished opinion—the effect of 
which is similar to a summary affirmance—sometimes signals to 
the Court the need for review.168 Although the Court certainly can 
and does sometimes review summarily affirmed cases, the simple 
truth is that the likelihood of granting such review is decreased.169 
Since the inception of the AIA, no summarily affirmed Federal 
Circuit case has generated certiorari from the Supreme Court. 
A survey of cert petitions emerging from cases summarily 
affirmed by the Federal Circuit reveals the potential for cert-
proofing. I have chosen to examine three cases—Hyundai Motor 
America, Inc. v. Clear with Computers, LLC; Cloud Satchel, LLC v. 
Barnes & Noble, Inc.; and Luv N’ Care Ltd. v. Munchkin, Inc.—to 
illustrate this point. 
 
 164. Joshua v. U.S., 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 165. Even if “substantial” questions of law are not being ignored, “cases are rarely 
identical and it can be argued that a rule of law develops and gains certainty in the frequency 
and changing circumstances in which it is expressed and applied.” Simonett, supra note 101, 
at 199. 
 166. STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 264 (10th ed. 2013). 
 167. See Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015). 
 168. See Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (noting that the decision not to publish was “another reason to grant review”). 
 169. See Stancil, supra note 149, at 24 (arguing that a summary affirmance is unlikely to 
generate certiorari because (1) the Court may be influenced by the traditional understanding 
that such opinions are less important and (2) the Court will have to invest additional time 
and energy to determine if a cert-worthy issue is present). 
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Before proceeding, I wish to clarify that I do not intend to 
suggest that the Federal Circuit is consistently and blatantly seek-
ing to evade Supreme Court review. It is unlikely that cert-proofing 
is the driving explanation for the court’s summary affirmance rate. 
I simply argue that it is plausible that a panel may dispose of a case 
(or group of cases related to the same issue) using summary 
affirmance hoping, be it consciously or subconsciously, that the 
case will not find its way to the Supreme Court.170  
1. Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Clear with Computers, LLC 
Clear with Computers, LLC (CWC) filed a patent infringement 
suit against Hyundai Motor America, Inc. (HMA), alleging that 
HMA infringed on a patent for an electronic proposal preparation 
system. CWC secured an $11.6 million judgment in the district 
court. This suit represented CWC’s sixth attempt to sue HMA, each 
suit being a variation on the same theme, and all prior suits were 
resolved in HMA’s favor.171 At trial and on appeal, HMA argued 
that prior to the filing of CWC’s patent application, “the market-
place was awash in electronic proposal” preparation systems.172 
HMA also objected to jury instruction that HMA bears the burden 
of proving invalidity by the clear and convincing evidence 
standard.173 HMA contended that such a standard to patent 
invalidity, without distinguishing between factual and legal 
aspects of the inquiry, conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. 
Specifically, a clear and convincing evidence standard should 
apply only to factual matters, such as whether a prior art reference 
had been published, and should not be considered in determining 
 
 170. Regardless of the court’s intentions, it should be reemphasized that litigation costs 
and legal ambiguities could be reduced if the court took a hard look at its summary 
affirmance habit. 
 171. Brief for Appellant at 1, Clear with Computers, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, 
Inc., No. 2012-1291 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2012), 2012 WL 9082954, at *1. 
 172. Id. at 3. 
 173. Id. at 66. 
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how to apply the law to the facts.174 HMA also raised an interesting 
question concerning the “anticipation doctrine.”175 
The Federal Circuit passed over the opportunity to decide the 
validity of non-practicing inventors’176 method patents and the 
proper extent of the “anticipation doctrine” in modern patent law. 
In its petition for writ of certiorari, HMA argued that there was no 
justification for the Federal Circuit’s “one-line summary affirm-
ance.”177 HMA found the court’s summary affirmance egregious 
given that Congress established the Federal Circuit for the express 
purpose of promoting unity in patent law, and the court’s one-line 
decisions leaves parties and the lower courts in confusion.178 
HMA’s pleas for review did not resonate with the Supreme 
Court as its petition for certiorari was denied. Like with many cert 
denials, one cannot know exactly why the Supreme Court chose to 
deny HMA’s petition. However, given that the Supreme Court has 
been reluctant to review summarily disposed cases, it is likely that 
the Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance played a role in the 
denial of HMA’s cert petition. 
2. Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc. 
In Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., a district court 
invalidated a patent for memory-conserving wireless exchange of 
documents between a handheld device and remote database. Cloud 
Satchel questioned whether the district court correctly applied the 
 
 174. Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 114 (2011) (“[I]n this area of law as 
in others the evidentiary standard of proof applies to questions of fact and not to questions 
of law.”). 
 175. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“A patent 
is invalid for anticipation if a single prior art reference discloses each and every limitation of 
the claimed invention. Moreover, a prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a 
feature of the claimed invention if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or 
inherent, in the single anticipating reference.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 176. In other words, “patent trolls.” “A patent troll uses patents as legal weapons, 
instead of actually creating any new products or coming up with new ideas. Trolls are in the 
business of litigation (or even just threatening litigation). They often buy up patents cheaply 
from companies down on their luck who are looking to monetize what resources they have 
left, such as patents.” Patent Trolls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff 
.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims. 
 177. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Clear with 
Computers, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 619 (2013) (No. 13-296). 
 178. Id. at 29. 
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two-step analysis required by Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank and 
argued that the Federal Circuit’s use of Rule 36 to affirm the district 
court’s ruling defies the right to appeal set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a). In its petition for certiorari, Cloud Satchel argued that 
“[t]he most prevalent and significant issue facing litigants of patent 
rights today is the proper application of [the Supreme] Court’s 
decision in Alice to cases involving computer and internet 
technology.”179 The Federal Circuit’s brief affirmance of the lower 
court’s decision skirted this “significant issue.”180 As the lone patent 
law gatekeeper below the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit 
shirked its responsibility when it failed to provide “a reasoned 
opinion that would provide the parties . . . [and] the district courts 
additional guidance on how to avoid improperly applying Alice.”181 
Cloud Satchel argued that the Federal Circuit’s use of summary 
affirmance “has reduced the right to appeal . . . to simply a right to 
a hollow affirmation of an improper lower court opinion.”182 
The general reception toward Alice was that the Court failed to 
provide sufficient guidance for future cases.183 Cloud Satchel 
presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clearly define 
principles such as the boundary between abstract ideas and patent-
eligible implementations of ideas. Nonetheless, the Court denied 
Cloud Satchel’s petition for certiorari.184 Although multiple factors 
may have contributed to the cert denial, the Federal Circuit’s 
summary affirmance likely created a hurdle the Court chose not 
to jump. 
 
 179. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 34, Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 
136 S. Ct. 1723 (2016) (No. 15-1161). 
 180. For a list of other cases where this has been raised and summarily affirmed by the 
Federal Circuit, see Harter & Quinn, supra note 10. 
 181. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 179, at 35. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Brian Fung, The Supreme Court’s Decision on Software Patents Still Doesn’t Settle 
the Bigger Question, WASH. POST (June 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/the-switch/wp/2014/06/20/the-supreme-courts-decision-on-software-patents-still-doesnt 
-settle-the-bigger-question/ (“[T]he court decided the most basic conflict in the case, but more 
or less declined to offer guidance for other, future cases.”); Rob Merges, Symposium: Go Ask 
Alice—What Can You Patent After Alice v. CLS Bank?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014, 12:04 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after 
-alice-v-cls-bank/ (“To say we did not get an answer is to miss the depth of the non-answer 
we did get.”). 
 184. Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1723 (2016). 
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3. Luv N’ Care Ltd. v. Munchkin, Inc. 
Luv N’ Care Ltd. v. Munchkin, Inc. presented a number of 
meritorious issues. First, the case came to the Federal Circuit on 
appeal from an IPR proceeding before the PTAB. Additionally, the 
case represented the first IPR of a design patent. The PTAB 
instituted review on obviousness grounds of a patent directed to 
the ornamental design for a drinking cup. During the proceeding, 
the PTAB rejected an argument that the references used to 
challenge Luv N’ Care’s (LNC) patent were not prior art. The PTAB 
also denied LNC’s motion to amend a claim, finding that such an 
amendment would improperly enlarge the claimed subject matter. 
The latter issue is particularly interesting given that the Federal 
Circuit had offered little to no guidance on the requirements for 
amending claims during an IPR proceeding. On appeal to the 
Federal Circuit, LNC argued that the PTAB unfairly introduced 
new issues in its final written decision in violation of due process 
rights and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).185 Despite the 
importance and novelty of the issues, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the PTAB’s decision without an opinion.186 
In its petition for certiorari, LNC sought review of its case by 
arguing that the PTAB inappropriately conducted the admini-
strative trial, denying petitioner due process guarantees. Again, the 
Supreme Court denied the petition.187 Because the antedating 
references and motion to amend claims issues were not preserved 
on appeal, it is very unlikely that the Supreme Court would have 
decided those issues.188 However, the confluence of the APA and 
due process rights, as they relate to raising new issues in a final 
decision, is something the Supreme Court would perhaps deem 
warranting judicial review. Yet again, it would seem that the 
Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance may have provided the 
necessary insulation from the Supreme Court. 
 
 185. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20–24, Luv n’ Care, Ltd. v. Munchkin, Inc., 136 
S. Ct. 405 (2015) (No. 15-242). 
 186. Granted, Luv N’ Care did not challenge the PTAB’s denial of its motion to amend 
on appeal. 
 187. Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Munchkin, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 405 (2015). 
 188. SUP. CT. R. 14 (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, 
will be considered by the Court.”). 
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In short, in each of these cases, though multiple factors likely 
played a role in the court’s choice to invoke Rule 36, the potential 
for cert-proofing is apparent and deserving of attention.  
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Although the purpose of this Comment is to highlight an issue 
in the Federal Circuit and not definitively propose solutions to the 
problem, some plausible solutions (and their shortcomings) are 
worth mentioning. These solutions by and large assume the court 
is using summary affirmance for the legitimate reason of reducing 
its caseload.189  
One possible fix is to increase the number of Federal Circuit 
judges to handle the court’s expanding caseload. This solution has 
been suggested as a means of assisting not only the Federal Circuit 
but the judiciary as a whole.190 However, it is unlikely that the 
Federal Circuit will see an increase in the number of active judges 
in the near future.191 The Federal Circuit is far from overburdened 
when comparing its caseload with that of the other circuits.192 Not 
only is it unlikely that the Federal Circuit will see an increase in the 
number of active judges, but this solution is also not without 
 
 189. If the court is using summary affirmance for illegitimate reasons, a more dramatic 
solution may be necessary. 
 190. Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where 
Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b (“The last time Con-
gress passed a major judgeship bill was in 1990. Since then, there’s been a 39 percent increase 
in filings at district and circuit courts but only a 4 percent increase in judgeships. The Judicial 
Conference recommended in March that Congress create 77 more judgeships for district 
courts and five more for circuit courts to keep up with current workloads.”). 
 191. Michel, supra note 57, at 1190 (“Similarly, it is unlikely that the complement of 
authorized, active judges on the court, which now stands at twelve, will ever be increased. 
The total number of cases decided per year by the court is already considerably less than 
other circuits.”). Perhaps the complexity of the court’s docket would justify increasing the 
number of judges. But again, this is unlikely. 
 192. See, e.g., Table B-8. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, 
Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 30, 2015, U.S. CT. 
APPEALS FOR FED. CIR. (2015), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court 
/statistics/appeals_filed_terminated_and_pending.pdf (showing that 1711 cases were filed 
in the Federal Circuit between September 30, 2014, and September 30, 2015); U.S. Courts of 
Appeals Federal Court Management Statistics (June 30, 2016), U.S. CTS. (2016), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2016/06/30-2 (show-
ing, for example, that 8675 cases were filed in the Fifth Circuit during the 2015 fiscal year). 
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serious institutional flaws. Enlarging the size of the judiciary in-
creases inefficiencies, internal conflicts, and uncertainty in le-
gal outcomes.193 
Another potential solution to resolving the court’s overburden-
ed docket, and the consequential inability to issue a written 
decision in many of its cases, is to decentralize patent law’s 
uniformity. The Federal Circuit was designed to clarify ambiguities 
in patent law jurisprudence.194 Although the court may, in part, be 
achieving this goal, it is far from perfect in creating a unified body 
of law. Some empirical studies suggest that the Federal Circuit is 
often divided, much like other circuit courts who are often split on 
areas of the law.195 Dividing patent jurisdiction could serve the 
beneficial effect of creating circuit splits that allow for experi-
mentation and for appellate courts to make informed decisions 
regarding which interpretation to follow. However, the fact cannot 
be denied that patent disputes are often best handled by those with 
particular expertise. Patent law is quite technical, and there is a real 
danger in allowing other circuit courts to adjudicate patent 
appeals.196 Furthermore, patent attorneys, examiners, and bureau-
crats are likely to resist any attempt to restore patent jurisdiction to 
the regional circuit courts. For these reasons, many commentators 
 
 193. Harvie J. Wilkinson III, We Don’t Need More Federal Judges, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 9, 
1998, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB886954981630694500 (explaining that the 
consequences of increasing the size of the judiciary include inefficiency, litigiousness, 
and intrusiveness). 
 194. See S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (“The . . . [c]ommission singled out patent law as 
an area in which the application of the law to the facts of a case often produces different 
outcomes in different courtrooms in substantially similar cases.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Petherbridge, supra note 15, at 466 (“[I]t is at least possible that areas of 
law within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction might actually have more variety than a 
comparative area of law subject to regional circuit jurisdiction.”); R. Polk Wagner & Lee 
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1176–78 (2004) (calling for “evangelism” among individual judges to 
resolve a methodological split); Patricia Martone, Why Is the Fed. Cir. So Deeply Divided on 
Patent Cases?, LAW360 (Oct. 13, 2015, 6:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/712916 
/why-is-the-fed-circ-so-deeply-divided-on-patent-cases (“[T]he outcome of an appeal has 
long been quite dependent on the panel hearing the case. The disagreements have just 
become more prominent.”). 
 196. Shapiro, supra note 96. 
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are “skeptical that the Federal Circuit will be stripped of its patent 
jurisdiction anytime soon.”197 
The Supreme Court could further check the Federal Circuit’s 
obsession with de novo review.198 Doing so would ideally free up 
time needed to publish an opinion in those summarily affirmed 
cases deserving a written decision. However, given the recency of 
the Court’s admonition to limit de novo review,199 it seems unlikely 
that the Court will step in and further chastise the Federal Circuit. 
Furthermore, the reality is that patent law disputes are highly fact 
intensive and some level of de novo review is arguably needed to 
effectively resolve certain cases appealed to the Federal Circuit.200 
A final solution201 to deal with the Federal Circuit’s growing 
caseload is to publish shorter per curiam opinions that briefly 
explain the essential rationale for a decision. Because judges are 
identified as the authors of judicial opinions, they often feel 
pressured to produce lengthy, scholarly opinions.202 One former 
Federal Circuit judge has reasoned that perhaps as much as half of 
the delay in the average case can be attributed to the human factor 
of the opinion process.203 Published per curiam opinions could help 
save the court’s time, thus allowing judges to issue more published 
opinions whilst simultaneously giving the court a chance to explain 
its reasoning. 
A per curiam opinion puts forth the rationale agreed upon by 
all three members of a panel of judges.204 Per curiam opinions, if 
published, can have the binding force of law and function as 
precedent just as authored, published opinions do.205 However, per 
curiam opinions may be shorter, and because the opinion is 
 
 197. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1464 
(2012); see LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 229 (2011). 
 198. See supra Section III.A. 
 199. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). 
 200. See J. Jonas Anderson, Specialized Standards of Review, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 151, 
165–87 (2014) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s use of the de novo standard of review). 
 201. Professor Dennis Crouch recommends an additional fix: require the Federal Cir-
cuit to write opinions in all appeals stemming from PTO actions. Crouch, supra note 9, at *26–
27; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Shore v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 2197 (2017) (No. 16-1240), 2017 
WL 1406097. Given his coverage of this solution, I do not address it here. 
 202. Michel, supra note 57, at 1201. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 1202. 
 205. Id. 
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unanimous, often less time is taken by individual judges drafting 
and editing the opinion. The Federal Circuit rarely uses per curiam 
opinions to hand down precedential decisions.206 The court could 
reverse this trend and use published per curiam opinions to decide 
Rule 36 summary affirmance cases—cases in which the judges 
already unanimously agree on the outcome. If the court really is 
using summary affirmance as a tool to cert-proof cases, then the per 
curiam opinion fix would help resolve the issue because published 
per curiam opinions that even tersely declare the law are less likely 
to avoid Supreme Court review. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s decision-making has been under fire since 
the court’s inception. Yet little has been written about the court’s 
summary affirmance practice. The court has employed Rule 36 
more frequently than ever, likely as a result of the court’s increasing 
caseload. The passage of the AIA and the creation of new post-grant 
proceedings has only added to the court’s burden. While the court’s 
use of Rule 36 may be understandable given the number of complex 
appeals pending on the docket, the Federal Circuit’s summary 
affirmance practice functions as a detriment to the development of 
the law. Although it is impossible to understand exactly why the 
court is using summary affirmance at such a high rate, the court’s 
habit of de novo review, attempts to maintain panel collegiality, 
and poor party briefing may be contributing factors. One 
additional, plausible theory is that the Federal Circuit occasionally 
uses summary affirmance as a tool to cert-proof cases. This 
hypothesis is reasonable given the Federal Circuit’s strained 
relationship with the Supreme Court, but it almost certainly does 
not fully explain the problem. The purpose of this Comment is not 
to fully resolve the issues created by the Federal Circuit’s summary 
affirmance practice but simply functions to point out the problems 
and plausible causes. Future research can postulate a proper 
method for fixing these issues. 
 
Andrew Hoffman* 
 
 206. Id. 
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